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Proust and Schopenhauer 
David Bather Woods 
 
Abstract 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I identify the mentions of 
Schopenhauer in À la recherche du temps perdu. I use an implicit reference to Schopenhauer 
by Swann to open a discussion of Schopenhauer’s theory of music. I attempt to downplay its 
identification, suggested by some commentators, with both the views about music expressed 
in the novel and the form of the novel itself. In the second section, I discuss Proust’s 
references to Schopenhauer in his essay on reading. I confirm that Proust well understood 
Schopenhauer’s relationship with his own erudition and suggest that Schopenhauer’s 
influence on Proust may take the form of an incitement to think for oneself. In the third and 
final section, I consider several potential points of convergence between Proust and 
Schopenhauer concerning states of the will. However, in all cases I find, as I do throughout 
the chapter, that below the surface Proust and Schopenhauer often part ways. 
 
Schopenhauer in Proust’s novel 
 
Strong claims have been made about Proust’s reception of Schopenhauer. The strongest so far 
is Anne Henry’s (1989) that À la recherche du temps perdu is a literary translation of 
Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation. If this were true, it might come as a 
surprise that Schopenhauer is mentioned by name only twice in the novel. Both instances 
occur in the final volume and in connection, for some reason, with Mme de Cambremer. In 
the first, the Narrator and Bloch have run into Saint-Loup on his way to an appointment with 
M. de Cambremer at the Ministry of War. The Narrator offhandedly expresses a low opinion 
of both the Cambremers, which he mentally retracts by recalling his eventual discovery that 
Mme de Cambremer was, in fact, ‘a remarkable woman, who knew her Schopenhauer’. He is 
then taken aback by Saint-Loup’s next remark: ‘His wife is an idiot, I won’t try to defend her’ 
(TR, 70; IV 318). The second instance comes from the mouth of Mme de Cambremer herself 
at the Princess de Guermantes’s party in the finale of the novel. She recommends: ‘You must 
reread what Schopenhauer says about music’, to which the Duchess de Guermantes replies, 
‘Re-read is pretty rich, I must say. Who does she think she’s fooling?’ (TR, 444–45; IV 569). 
In both scenes, Schopenhauer momentarily raises Mme de Cambremer’s cultural capital, only 
for a Guermantes to put her back in her place. Why Schopenhauer specifically is selected for 
this purpose is unclear. It is, however, ironic that in the same passage the Duchess is said to 
believe that ‘to be easily bored was a mark of intellectual superiority’, when she would have 
learned from reading Schopenhauer herself that proneness to boredom is a sign of mental 
inactivity and dullness (PP 1: 281). 
 In any case, two full mentions is not a bad score, comparatively speaking. The 
philosopher most mentioned in the novel, Plato, appears no more than ten times (according to 
Large’s [2001] count). Schopenhauer ranks below Nietzsche (six), Kant (five), and a handful 
of others, but he is at least on a par with Rousseau, and, perhaps most importantly, above his 
arch-rival Hegel, who gets one solitary mention (the same, surprising to some, as Bergson). 
To be mentioned at all, that is to say, is a rare distinction. 
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 Plus, there is one more reference to Schopenhauer in the novel. It is implicit but 
unmistakeable and rather important. The occasion is an intimate piano performance of 
Vinteuil’s sonata at the Swann household by Mme Swann herself, which prompts Swann to 
verbalise some reflections on the nature of music and conclude with the remark: ‘I’m merely 
trying to point out to this young fellow here that what music shows, to me at any rate, is 
nothing like “The Will-in-Itself”’ (In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower, translated by 
James Grieve, London: Allen Lane, 2002 p. 109–110; BG, 146; I 524). Generations of 
readers in English might have missed this reference because the popular translation by 
Moncrieff, Kilmartin, and Enright goes with “the triumph of the Will”, giving it a 
Nietzschean ring. In the Pléiade edition, however, the original phrase, “Volonté en soi”, 
comes with a note suggesting that it may a reference to Schopenhauer (citing Henry 1981). It 
is hard to imagine what else it could be: Swann must be disagreeing with Schopenhauer’s 
idiosyncratic theory that music is a direct manifestation of the will-to-life.  
On Schopenhauer’s view, any analogy we sense between music and the world is not 
because music is a copy of the world, but because both are copies of the same thing: the will-
to-life. Music seems abstractly to go through the same ordeal as a living being: relentlessly 
moving forward in time, building tensions repeatedly and finding resolution only temporarily, 
or resolving itself permanently only at the point of its temporal end. The structure of music, 
moreover, corresponds to the entire natural order; it encompasses all the levels of nature 
which, according to Schopenhauer, each individually correspond to a different art form. He 
suggests more than once, for example, that architecture corresponds to inorganic nature 
because it ‘reveal[s] the Ideas in which the will objectifies itself on the lowest levels, and at 
the same time contribute the deepest, lingering bass-tones of nature’ (WWR 1: 235). When 
music expresses a feeling, it is not ‘this or that individual and particular joy, this or that 
sorrow or pain or horror or exaltation or cheerfulness or peace of mind, but rather joy, 
sorrow, pain, horror, exaltation, cheerfulness and peace of mind as such in themselves, 
abstractly' (WWR 1: 289).  
At first Swann seems to come close to agreeing with Schopenhauer’s theory by noting 
some strong general resemblances between music and nature: ‘The moment when night is 
falling among the trees, when the arpeggios of the violin call down a cooling dew upon the 
earth’ (BG, 144; I 523). As he goes on, however, it becomes clear that these are not just any 
trees but those of the Bois de Boulogne; the apparent mirroring of nature in music turns out to 
be Swann’s own reminiscence on the scenes of his early courtship with Mme Swann, which 
was set to the tunes of Vinteuil. Rather than an independent copy of fundamental reality, 
then, music, to Swann, evokes something personal, private, and local. In an odd coincidence 
(or maybe not), shortly after this barely concealed reference to Schopenhauer, Mme de 
Cambremer becomes the topic of conversation once again: ‘Hundreds of times’, Swann says, 
‘without my leaving this room, the little phrase has carried me off to dine with it at 
Armenonville. Good God, it’s less boring, anyhow, than having to go there with Mme de 
Cambremer’ (BG, 146; I 524–25). Why Schopenhauer and Mme de Cambremer always go 
hand in hand is anyone’s guess, but she never comes out of it well. 
 It is ironic that one of Proust’s main characters – the one endowed with the greatest 
art-critical acumen, albeit for painting – disagrees with Schopenhauer on music, when it is 
over his theory of music that Proust’s commentators have made some of the strongest claims 
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for Schopenhauer’s influence. Henry’s (1981: 8) claim that Vinteuil’s music was ‘written by’ 
Schopenhauer is endorsed, and elaborated on, by the musicologist Jean-Jacques Nattiez 
(1989: 78–87), who traces the thesis further back to Samuel Beckett: ‘A book could be 
written on the significance of music in the work of Proust, in particular the music of Vinteuil 
… The influence of Schopenhauer on this aspect of the Proustian demonstration is 
unquestionable’ (Beckett 1931: 70). Beckett expands little on this programme of research.1 
He does, however, identify, as above, the point where Swann and Schopenhauer part ways: 
Swann personalises the ‘little phrase’ of Vinteuil’s sonata with his own associations, 
‘spatialises what is extra-spatial, establishes it as the national anthem of his love’ (Beckett 
1931: 72). Schopenhauer, by contrast, insists that music is tainted when it imitates the image 
of the world: ‘imagistic music is reprehensible once and for all’ (PP 2: 382). Unlike the other 
arts, music is not mediated by the Platonic Ideas of natural kinds, he thinks, and not 
apprehended in space but in time alone, that is, as a temporal sequence without a spatial 
location. Its elevation makes it not just transcendent but almost mystical: ‘In every age’, 
Schopenhauer says, ‘people have played music without being able to give an account of it’. 
Even his own attempt, he says, ‘cannot do more than to present the explanation that I find 
personally satisfying of the marvellous musical art’ (WWR 1: 284).  
‘Music’, Schopenhauer says, ‘is an unconscious exercise in metaphysics, in which the 
mind does not know that it is philosophizing’ (WWR 1: 292), parodying Leibniz’s 
mathematically minded view that it is an unconscious exercise in arithmetic (as again Beckett 
notes). The truths that music reveals are thus deep and timeless; it is not essentially evocative 
of specific times and places, as it is for Swann. If it were the fixed role of music in Proust’s 
novel to express the timeless, metaphysical essence of the world in the form of time alone, 
then this would make some sense of the Henry-Nattiez thesis that Schopenhauer ‘wrote’ the 
music of Vinteuil. But the thesis is doubtful because, in Swann’s case, whenever he hears the 
Vinteuil sonata, it only brings his life flooding back to him, rather than life itself. Years later, 
when Albertine plays Rameau and Borodin as well as Vinteuil to the Narrator, the images 
that the music summons are at least images of the wider world unseen to him: ‘now an 
eighteenth-century tapestry sprinkled with cupids and roses, now the Eastern steppe in which 
sounds are muffled by the boundless distances and the soft carpet of snow’ (C, 514; III 883–
84). But even so, when the Narrator lectures Albertine on the significance of Vinteuil – 
imitating Swann not for the first or last time – he wavers between the hypothesis that music 
corresponds ‘to some define spiritual reality’ (C, 504; III 876), on the one hand, and the 
‘materialist hypothesis’, on the other, that there is nothing especially profound about music at 
all (C, 513; III 883). 
A further assumption would need to be made for the even stronger thesis that the form 
of Proust’s entire novel takes after Schopenhauer’s theory of music. This would be the 
assumption that literature, for Proust, aspires to music conceived along Schopenhauerian 
lines; that literature, too, aims comprehensively to express, in the form of time alone, the 
timeless truths that appear in the world as representation. Nattiez, for one, endorses this 
reading of Proust, ‘where music is treated as the ideal and Utopian model for literature’ 
(1989: 87). Certainly, by the end of the novel, the Narrator has at least ‘conceived the 
ambition to make visible, to intellectualise in a work of art, realities that were outside Time’ 
(TR, 351; IV 508–509). But it is hard to see how, for the diehard Schopenhauerian, literature 
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can move any closer to music than this, since literature for Schopenhauer simply lacks the 
same essential quality of abstractness which is possessed by music. Non-musical art forms (at 
least those known to Schopenhauer) may express things ‘as such in themselves’ but only ever 
by representing idealised and extreme instances of this or that thing.  
Instead of attempting to generalise Schopenhauer’s theory of music as a guiding 
artistic principle for Proust’s approach to literature, it would be better to pick up on 
Schopenhauer’s own general thesis about the role of the arts: ‘If the whole world as 
representation is only the visibility of the will, then art is the clarification of this visibility, the 
camera obscura that shows objects with greater purity and allows them to be surveyed and 
summarized more readily, the play within a play, Hamlet’s stage upon the stage’ (WWR 1: 
295). Here we have not only a purifying clarification of the visible world – a recognisably 
Proustian aspiration – but also, as an outcome, a world within a world, as the strongly 
Schopenhauerian interpreters of Proust’s novel seem to want it to be. 
 All this would be only if we accepted in the first place that Proust’s novel is the 
transliteration of a monolithic philosophical principle. Several commentators have lined up to 
doubt that assumption. ‘À la recherche is a novel. It is not a philosophical treatise’, says 
Thomas Baldwin (2013: 79), who quotes Vincent Descombes: Proust’s ‘task is not to 
illustrate philosophical themes, but to compose a narrative’ (1992: 35). This has implications 
for the very notion that it is among Proust’s objectives to make manifest a preferred, pre-
existing philosophy, whether it be Schopenhauer’s or someone else’s. Duncan Large, who 
also follows Descombes, argues that, while Proust’s first-hand knowledge of Nietzsche was 
‘no more than passing, his knowledge of Schopenhauer formed the basis for a response 
similar to that of Nietzsche himself’ (2001: 26). Even if Proust was ultimately some sort of 
Nietzschean, then, it was largely by coincidence. Joshua Landy agrees, adding that while 
‘Proust is (without his knowledge) closer to Nietzsche than to any other philosopher … 
Proust also goes beyond Nietzsche in certain respects’ (2004: 6n.). Of course, while the novel 
is different from a philosophical treatise, this does not preclude it from expressing or 
entailing philosophical ideas, old and new; but the point is that it does other things besides, 
many of them not philosophical in their significance, and so we should be cautious about any 
attempt to use a specially selected philosophical system as the key to Proust’s novel, or at 
least limit our expectations of what this approach is capable of unlocking. 
 A convincing instance of Proust’s ‘para-Nietzschean departure’ (Landy 2004: 50n.) 
from Schopenhauer can be found, Large argues, in his presentations of aesthetic experience 
(Large 2004: 34–36). Building on Julia Kristeva’s observation that Kantian disinterestedness 
is not an essential element of aesthetic experience for Proust – ‘Proust combines the 
sacredness of music with erotic perversion’ (Kristeva 1996: 264) – Large notes that this 
moves Proust fundamentally away from Schopenhauer and towards Nietzsche. As Nietzsche 
says: ‘No less an authority than the divine Plato (– as Schopenhauer himself calls him) asserts 
something else: that all beauty is a temptation to procreate, – that this is precisely the 
proprium of its effect, from the most sensual all the way up to the most spiritual’ (2005: 203). 
For Schopenhauer aesthetic experience is always ecstatic but never erotic; for Nietzsche, it 
seems, it is always erotic, often ecstatic. For Proust, his characters are as capable of 
displaying the above Nietzschean sensual rapture as they are Kantian-Schopenhauerian 
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disinterest. For the latter, for example, consider Swann’s detached contemplation of a group 
of ugly male faces:  
 
‘even this ugliness of faces which of course were mostly familiar to him seemed 
something new now that their features – instead of being to him symbols of practical 
utility in the identification of this or that person who until then had represented merely 
so many pleasure to be pursued, boredoms to be avoided, or courtesies to be 
acknowledged – rested in the autonomy of their lines, measurable by aesthetic co-
ordinates along’ (SW, 463; I 320–21).   
 
Schopenhauer in Proust’s essays 
 
While it may be doubted that Proust and his novel were, in fact, Schopenhauerian, no one can 
deny that he knew a good deal about Schopenhauer. He is said to have become familiar with 
the work of Schopenhauer through attending lectures by the aesthetician Gabriel Séailles 
between October 1894 and March 1895, during his bachelor’s degree at the Sorbonne, when 
he was also strongly influenced by the French neo-Kantian idealists Émile Boutroux and 
Alphonse Darlu. Proust attentively read psychologists Paul Janet and Théodule Ribot, who in 
turn wrote extensively on Schopenhauer (see Kristeva 1996: 159–69; Tadié 2000: 204; 
Baldwin 2013: 75; François 2017: 479). 
 In ‘Days of Reading’ (ASB 195–233; CSB 160-194), Proust shows off what must be 
first-hand acquaintance with Schopenhauer’s works. Proust ‘recalls’ a passage in The World 
as Will and Representation where Schopenhauer reels off a dozen or so quotations from other 
distinguished writers, all of which point generally to the same pessimistic conclusions as his: 
that suffering is essential to life, that it would be better never to have been born and for the 
world not to exist. The list includes Voltaire, Herodotus, Plutarch, Swift, Plato, Heraclitus, 
Sophocles, Euripides, Homer, Pliny, Shakespeare, Byron, and Gracián. The passage Proust 
has in mind can only be the final paragraphs of chapter 46 of the second volume of The 
World as Will and Representation, titled ‘On the Nothingness and Suffering in Life’. Judging 
by his near perfect accuracy – Proust only misses one writer, Giacomo Leopardi, but 
correctly paraphrases them all in the exact same order as Schopenhauer – it seems likely that 
he had the book open in front of him (although, he was said to be gifted at memorising 
quotations verbatim; see Fraisse 2014: 61). 
In the same essay, Proust refers to ‘Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life’, a long section 
of the first volume of Schopenhauer’s late work Parerga and Paralipomena which is often 
published as a standalone book. Again Proust highlights Schopenhauer’s tendency to furnish 
his claims with a consensus of several quotations, while at the same time – and this is what 
Proust admires – evidently remaining an original thinker. He is impressed that Schopenhauer, 
despite how often he quotes others, can say in all seriousness: ‘Compilation is not my forte’. 
In fact, what Schopenhauer exactly says – ‘Kompilieren nicht meine Sache ist’ (SW 5: 334), 
‘compilation is not my business’ – does not suggest a lack of talent for stringing together 
good quotations, but ultimately a lack of interest. It is not his primary aim to rehearse age old 
wisdom, even though they would, and do, corroborate his point of view. 
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 Proust takes this as an opportunity to praise Schopenhauer, and here he can be taken 
at his word, unlike in his novel, because he writes in his own voice: ‘Schopenhauer … offers 
us the image of a mind whose vitality wears the most enormous reading lightly, each new 
item of knowledge being at once reduced to its element of reality, to the portion of life that it 
contains’ (ASB, 217; CSB, 185). Schopenhauer has successfully navigated what Proust calls 
the ‘dangers of erudition’, that is, not by posing as unerudite as some philosophers do  – 
Wittgenstein said of himself that no philosopher had read less philosophy (Britton 1967: 60–
61), although he too had avidly read Schopenhauer – but instead by being extremely, openly 
erudite, and yet at the same time keeping life and the world in mind as his ultimate primary 
source. 
 This model of originality-despite-erudition differs, as it happens, from the one 
proposed by James Acheson (1978) to explain the tension in Beckett’s argument that on the 
one hand À la recherche derives from Schopenhauer and yet on the other Proust is an original 
thinker. Acheson explains that innovation lies in ‘original use of received materials’ (1978: 
168), giving another example suggested by Beckett: that Joyce applied Vico’s theory of 
history to matters of literary style, that Vico in turn borrowed from Bruno, and Bruno from 
the philosophy of ancient Greece. A similar model is offered by Maurice E. Chernovitz 
(1945: 184), who lists Schopenhauer first among the sources that Proust synthesises. Proust’s 
understanding of how Schopenhauer maintained his originality, however, which could be 
reapplied to Proust himself, is not merely by fashioning an original synthesis or application of 
existing ideas, but by placing enough trust in the power of his intellectual faculties to verify 
those ideas against his own observations of the world. This makes Schopenhauer himself, not 
the thinkers he quotes, the ultimate authority. 
 Proust is, furthermore, correct about Schopenhauer’s relationship to his influences. 
Schopenhauer, too, is wary of erudition: ‘Reading’, he says, ‘is a mere surrogate for one’s 
own thinking’, and for this reason, ‘erudition makes most people even more stupid and 
simple than they already are by nature’ (PP 2: 442). If one seeks to learn well from reading, 
one must assimilate, integrate, and organise the materials taken from books into the unity of 
one’s own thoughts, which inevitably requires some amount of thinking for oneself: ‘For only 
through the universal combination of what we know, and comparing every truth with every 
other, do we completely assimilate our own knowledge and take control of it’ (PP 2: 441). 
And in any case, according to Schopenhauer, ‘all who think for themselves are basically in 
agreement, and their difference arises only as one of standpoint’, which explains 
Schopenhauer’s tendency, as Proust notes, to quote liberally. As Schopenhauer explains it: 
‘Often I was pleasantly surprised afterwards to find formulations in ancient works by great 
men of propositions that I had hesitated to bring before the public because of their 
paradoxical nature’ (PP 2: 445). They give courage, that is, but not content. 
Proust, like Schopenhauer, was an anti-reader: voraciously well read, yet suspicious 
of reading. There are, moreover, some further details on which they agree about reading. At 
its best, it is a miraculous meeting of minds. However, despite this ‘fertile miracle of a 
communication effected in solitude’ (ASB, 208; CSB, 174), Proust rejects Ruskin’s 
suggestion that reading should occupy a preponderant role in our intellectual lives for reasons 
that are, once again, reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s suspicions of reading. On Proust’s 
reckoning, Ruskin recounts ‘a sort of beautiful Platonic myth’, that the ancients revealed 
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almost all the true ideas and left it to the moderns to unpack them by reading and study. 
Schopenhauer would say that the convergence of minds between the ancients and the 
moderns, at least in the case of true authentic thinkers, such as himself, is explained by them 
drawing upon the same original source – life, the world – rather than one borrowing from the 
other. 
Here, however, Proust and Schopenhauer begin to part ways. Proust never concedes, 
of course, that we merely borrow content from greater writers of the past, but he does see 
some virtues in the limitations of reading. Specifically, where Schopenhauer sees reading as a 
mere substitute for thinking for oneself, Proust sees it as an incitement to do so. A few 
beautiful and original sentences from a great writer, in Proust’s experience, conjure up a 
hidden world but offer us only a partial glimpse. The reader wants more, longing to see how 
the world would look if only the writer had turned their eye to this or that feature. Unless the 
writer has done so, however, this longing only becomes active by us looking for ourselves: 
‘The supreme effort of the writer as of the artist only succeeds in raising partially for us the 
veil of ugliness and insignificance that leaves us incurious before the universe. Then does he 
say: “Look, look”’ (ASB, 211; CSB, 178). For Schopenhauer, perhaps disingenuously, 
reading is barely a cognitive activity; for Proust, by contrast, it is erotic in the Platonic sense 
of inspiring a truth-seeking that is guided by the sense of beauty, and pedagogic in the 
Socratic sense of marking the limits of wisdom while demonstrating its power. ‘We feel very 
strongly’, Proust says, combining both, ‘that our own wisdom begins where that of the author 
leaves off, and we would like him to provide answers when all he is able to do is to provide 
us with desires’ (ASB, 210; CSB, 176). If Schopenhauer exerted an influence on Proust, then 
perhaps it was of this kind. 
 
Willing in Proust and Schopenhauer 
 
Proust and Schopenhauer share, among other things, a preoccupation with states of will. 
When they speak about the will, however, they often have different issues in mind. 
 A central concern for Proust, for instance, is weakness of will. At one point the 
Narrator, having stumbled into Jupien’s sado-masochistic brothel, describes lack of 
willpower as the ‘greatest of all vices’ (TR, 212; IV 414) since it enables all the other vices to 
dominate. The Narrator’s own weakness of will, by comparison, seems far less vicious, even 
tame: he has neglected his own obvious talent as a writer. He associates his weakness of will 
with the decline in his health, indicating some sort of pathological basis, and dates them both 
(twice: TR, 287; IV 465 and TR 526; IV 621) to the moment in his childhood when he first 
broke from his parents’ authority by demanding, successfully, a goodnight kiss from his 
mother (SW, 15, 35–58; I 13, 32–41), connecting up the first and final volumes of the novel. 
It is an irony that this defiantly wilful act precipitates a generalised weakness of will; it is 
another that an involuntary event restores the Narrator’s willpower back to him. For it is not 
until the epiphany brought on by a series of involuntary memories that the Narrator is literally 
revitalised – ‘now that three times in succession there had been reborn within me a veritable 
moment of the past, my appetite for life was immense’ (TR, 263; IV 450) – and that he 
recommits to his vocation, despite all the will this must require.2 
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 Schopenhauer’s philosophy is in many ways a philosophy of will par excellence. It 
rests on the insight that we experience ourselves in two aspects: once as a representing 
subject, and once as a subject of will. As a subject of will, we are granted access to ourselves 
as objects in a way that is sui generis different from our access to other objects of 
representation. Were it not for this inner insight, speculative metaphysical inquiry would be 
neither possible nor necessary, for we would simply assume that there is nothing to objects 
beyond their representations (WWR 1: 123–27). Schopenhauer proceeds to decipher the 
whole world, from the basic laws of nature to animal behaviour and the wide variety of 
human endeavours, on the assumption that they are various manifestations of a common 
essence which he finds within himself, the will-to-life. 
But he is, by contrast to Proust, only peripherally concerned with willpower and 
weakness of will. This is because the will, to Schopenhauer, is not a legislative faculty that 
constrains, licenses, or moderates our desires and wishes: it is our desires and wishes, and 
also our striving to achieve them. Schopenhauer barely even believes in the volitional faculty 
that is supposed to perform such a function, namely practical reason, and certainly not in the 
Kantian sense (WWR 2: 157; BM: 122). Reason never determines the ends of our actions – 
the will as distinct from reason does that – but at best it devises the means for achieving 
them. At most, maxims of action are relevant to moral life in the ‘struggle against the 
weakness of the moment, and [in] lending consistency to action’ (WWR 1: 83; see BM: 205–
206). ‘Ultimately’, Schopenhauer adds, ‘reason does the same for art, where it has just as 
little to do with the essential business, but supports its execution, since genius is not at one’s 
beck and call, and yet the work must still be perfected in all’. 
 Despite these differences, commentators have drawn comparisons between 
Schopenhauer and Proust over specific states of the will: for example, sexual desire. As one 
of Schopenhauer’s commentators, Patrick Gardiner, puts it: Schopenhauer traces ‘the sinuous 
paths, the subtle guises, taken by sexual feeling with an assiduity comparable to his admirer 
Proust, while at the same time (again like Proust) manifesting a complete disbelief in its 
capacity to reach any kind of final contentment or satisfaction’ (1963: 177).3 There are a few 
different thoughts in this. One is that sexual desire must take on guises at all: on 
Schopenhauer’s view, in fact, all forms of romantic love are the sex drive in disguise, as 
detailed in his influential chapter on the metaphysics of sexual love (WWR 2: 547–582). This 
sounds deflationary, but Schopenhauer prefers to think of it as a form of realism. After all, he 
does not believe that love is a fiction (as some aphorists suggest: ‘True love is like visitation 
by ghosts; everyone talks about such things, but few people have seen them’, La 
Rochefoucauld 2007: 25) but only that its reality is not what we tend to think. The reality of 
romantic love, according to Schopenhauer, is the species’ interest in making suitable matches 
masquerading as the individual’s interest in personal happiness. Romantic intensity is 
explained by the high stakes from the point of view of the species, namely its very survival. 
High romantic ideals – which, Schopenhauer believes, truly are fictions – help the species to 
achieve its end, sexual reproduction, after which they are jettisoned. For this reason, sexual 
desire is essentially connected to disillusionment and disappointment for Schopenhauer. 
Indeed, this goes for desire in general for Schopenhauer, which always sets out with inflated 
and vain hopes for an impossibly ultimate form of consummation. 
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We see the same dynamic between desire, idealisation, and disappointment repeatedly 
played out in Proust’s novel, especially in the early volumes, whose characters, including the 
Narrator, are beset by ideals of love, ones they have derived from art and literature as well as 
ones they have modelled on others, or simply invented for themselves. Swann, for example, 
can only find begin to find Odette physically attractive once he has discovered her likeness in 
a photograph of Zipporah from Botticelli’s Sistine chapel fresco (SW, 314–16; I 219–20). A 
formative disappointment for the young Narrator is the disparity between the image of the 
Duchess de Guermantes that he had built up in his head, and the one that he spots at the 
wedding of Doctor Percepied’s daughter – the real one, with a red face and a pimple flaring 
up at the corner of her nose. Like Swann, the Narrator takes a second look through the eyes of 
a would-be artist, to touch up the image in accordance with his desires and thereby reverse 
the disappointment: ‘my eyes resting upon her fair hair, her blue eyes, the lines of her neck, 
and overlooking the features which might have reminded me of the faces of other women, I 
cried out within myself as I admired this deliberately unfinished sketch: “How lovely she is! 
...”’ (SW 249; I 174). On this occasion the Narrator’s initial disappointment does not follow 
sexual consummation – it is not even on the table – although it will on later occasions. Here it 
is the failure of an artistic sort of consummation: that is, the ineluctable features of visible 
reality never quite match up to the ideals of his imagination as shaped by his romantic 
desires, except by a creative and wilful form of self-deception. Both the Narrator and Swann 
are compelled by erotic forces that they do not yet consciously understand, while being led by 
idealised images, crafted by themselves, which for a time allow them to feel that they do. 
The Narrator experiences a couple more failures of artistic consummation – a 
performance by La Berma, a meeting with Bergotte – these ones not just the failure of life in 
its raw form to present itself artistically but the failure of artists to present themselves as 
such, at least according to his then image of what an artist is. Around the same time he draws 
a series of deeply Schopenhauerian conclusions from the pain of his recent sexual awakening, 
the object of which is about to transfer from Gilberte to Albertine: for example, ‘There can be 
no peace of mind in love, since what one has obtained is never anything but a new starting-
point for further desires (BG, 213; I 571). Once Albertine has later fled his captivity, he 
realises that even if she were to return to him, it would never make him happy: 
 
‘whatever joy I might feel at the moment of her return, I sensed that very soon the 
same difficulties would recur and that to seek happiness in the satisfaction of a desire 
of the mind was as naïve as to attempt to reach the horizon by walking straight ahead. 
The further the desire advances, the further does real possession recede. So that if 
happiness, or at least the absence of suffering, can be found, it is not the satisfaction, 
but the gradual reduction and the eventual extinction of desire that one should seek’ 
(F, 607; IV 33–34) 
 
There is barely a word in this passage that Schopenhauer would not agree with. That joy, if 
possible, is short-lived; that it is quickly replaced with pain; that desiring has no terminus and 
is certainly no route to happiness; that the closest possible thing to happiness is not some final 
satisfaction of the will but rather its negation; and that this can only be achieved by the 
eventual elimination of our desires – all these things, Schopenhauer thought too:  




‘It is no more possible for some satisfaction to stop the will from willing new things 
than it is for time to begin or end. The will can have no lasting fulfilment that gives 
perfect and permanent satisfaction to its strivings … there is no highest good, no 
absolute good for the will, but rather only ever a temporary good. But if we would 
like to retain an old expression out of habit, giving it honorary or emeritus status, as it 
were, we might figuratively call the complete self-abolition and negation of the will 
… the absolute good, the summum bonum’ (WWR 1: 389). 
 
On another occasion, however, the Narrator portrays an almost polar alternative to the 
Schopenhauerian way of dealing with disappointment by eliminating desire. The Narrator 
tells us that Bergotte had lived an apparently simple life in the years running up to his death 
except for his expensive indulgence of countless young women. For Bergotte, remaining 
erotically active at all costs was a condition of his artistic productivity for several reasons. 
One: ‘pleasure that is at all rooted in the flesh is helpful to literary work because it cancels all 
others pleasure (C, 239; III 688). In particular, it stopped him wanting to go out. Also, it 
seems, maintenance of his libido simply kept him going: ‘restoring some degree of movement 
to a spiritual machine which, after a certain age, tends to come to a standstill’. But, most 
importantly, Bergotte values his desires not because their satisfaction makes him happy; he is 
prone, in fact, ‘to despise a thing … as soon as he had attained it’. By vainly pursuing his 
desires he gains, instead of happiness, ‘some insights into the reasons which prevent us from 
being happy and which would have remained invisible to us but for these sudden revelations 
of disappointment’. He values them, that is, for their disappointments, at least insofar as these 
disappointments illuminate aspects of life that he can then transform into literature (to 
transform into money, to transform into women…). It still not doubted here, however, that 
desire inevitably leads to disappointment. 
 Gardiner (1963: 195) draws a further comparison between Schopenhauer and Proust 
on the topic of what is perhaps Proust’s best-known motif: involuntary memory. He has the 
following passage from Schopenhauer in mind: 
 
‘it is … the blessing of a will-less intuition that, through an act of self-deception, it 
casts such a wonderful spell over things in the past or far away, presenting them to us 
in a so much rosier light. This is because when we picture days long past spent in a 
distant place, our imagination recalls only the objects, not the subject of the will, a 
subject that carried its incurable sufferings around with it then as well as now: but 
these have been forgotten because they have since made way for so many others. Now 
objective intuition operates in memory just as intuition of the present would operate if 
we were able to free ourselves from the will and surrender ourselves to intuition. That 
is why sudden memories of past and distant scenes fly past us like a lost paradise, 
especially when some difficulty troubles us more than usual’ (WWR 1: 222). 
 
As Gardiner notes, Schopenhauer’s claim is that memory is often accompanied by the same 
will-lessness that is, according to him, characteristic of all aesthetic perception. This is 
because the object of perception is recalled without the will of the subject. Consequently, our 
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memory of things is sunnier than we should expect, at least by comparison to the constant 
misery of the present – ‘happiness always lies in the future, or in the past, and the present is 
like a small dark cloud driven by the wind over the sunlit plains’ (WWR 2: 588). 
 Superficially, there are similarities between Schopenhauer and Proust on this score. 
For a start, Schopenhauer’s mere mention of the scenes of memory as a ‘lost paradise’ calls 
to mind Proust’s line which is in many ways programmatic for the entire novel: ‘the true 
paradises are the paradises that we have lost’ (TR, 261; VI 449). The primary way to recover 
lost paradises, according to the Narrator’s final reflections, is through memory. Furthermore, 
memory for Proust as for Schopenhauer is akin to aesthetic experience, at least with respect 
to the delightful – if, in Schopenhauer’s case, dispassionate – pleasures that they can afford. 
 As Acheson (1978: 173) correctly notes, however, none of the above similarities show 
that Schopenhauer foreshadowed Proust’s specific version of involuntary memories. There is 
a crucial difference between what Schopenhauer means by will-lessness and Proust by 
involuntariness: namely, Schopenhauer may or may not have in mind memories that are 
called up at will, for what is important to him is that the object of memory no longer affects 
the will in the way that it once did, whereas for Proust the only interesting kind of memories, 
the ones from which the events of his novel flow, are specifically those that cannot be 
recalled at will. For this reason, as Large argues, ‘Compared to Schopenhauer’s conception of 
“involuntary” memory, Proust’s is undoubtedly more will-less’ (2001: 189). 
 In defence of Schopenhauer, these commentators make their remarks in the light of 
Schopenhauer’s all too brief claims about will-less memory in The World as Will and 
Representation. In the later Parerga and Parlipomena, Schopenhauer finesses his views on 
memory over a series of aphorisms (§§348–354) which bring him at least a little closer to 
Proust. There are still traces there of Schopenhauer’s original view: for example, in memory 
the past is presented less sorrowfully – but also, interestingly, and quite consistently, less 
joyfully – ‘because joy and sorrow are not representations but affections of the will’ (PP 2: 
542). But among the things that he adds to his view, he includes the thought that memory is a 
capacity for searching one’s past, rather than simply a repository for storing it, and that this 
capacity is assisted by condensing memories into intuitive images, whether they be 
metonyms, similes, or analogies, adding that the imagistic nature of memory explains why we 
can more easily access experiences rather than abstractions, for example those abstractions 
taken from reading (PP 2: 543–44). He adds that in life there are moments of heighten 
receptivity and clarity of perception, which may occur without any special external cause, 
‘such that afterwards these moments remain indelibly impressed on our memory and are 
preserved in their entire individuality without our knowing why, nor why they alone stand out 
from so many thousands similar to them’; he even suggests that these are ‘the mosaic tiles 
from which the memory portrait of our lives is composed’ (PP 2: 545). Finally, Schopenhauer 
suggests a kind of involuntariness of memory that is different from his earlier notion of will-
less memory. First, he mentions banal forms of it: for example, when we are having trouble 
consciously recalling a word or name, so we give up, only to find that the name comes to us 
hours or weeks later, as if it were ‘whispered to me by someone’ (PP 2: 544). Then he gives 
the following example, which is reminiscent of Proustian involuntary memory if anything is:  
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‘That occasionally long forgotten scenes will suddenly and vividly enter our memory, 
apparently without any cause, may happen because we just now sensed the same 
delicate fragrance from long ago, which has not quite reached our clear 
consciousness. For it is well known that fragrances awaken memories with particular 
ease, and everywhere the association of ideas needs only an extremely slight push’ 
(PP 2: 545) 
 
 There is, however, one more apparent point of convergence between Schopenhauer 
and Proust which sees them, once again, part ways once the details are developed. This is that 
in both Proustian involuntary memory and Schopenhauerian will-less memory, assuming that 
the latter is modelled on Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic experience, there is a mutually 
corresponding transformation of the subject and the object such that both are in some way de-
temporalised. In Schopenhauer’s case, the subject of aesthetic experience is elevated to the 
‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of cognition’ while the object ‘is no longer the 
individual thing as such, but rather the Idea, the eternal form’ (WWR 1: 201). In Proust’s 
case, his Narrator can enjoy the impressions of involuntary memory ‘because in some way 
they were extra-temporal’ and because, correlatively, he discovers within himself a being ‘in 
the one and only medium which it could enjoy the essence of things, that is to say: outside 
time’ (TR, 262; IV 450). However, for Proust, it is essential to their correlation that this extra-
temporal being is having these extra-temporal impressions seemingly simultaneously in the 
past and in the present. It is crucial to the special kind of aesthetic experience that involuntary 
memory is because, insofar as it is past, the impression can be enjoyed as an object of the 
imagination, but insofar it is present, it is real – whereas, ordinarily, reality is disappointing 
and only the imaginary pleases and delights (TR, 263; IV 450–51). There is nothing quite like 
this in Schopenhauer; his suggestion, rather, is that memory enables us to apprehend the past 
just as we would apprehend the present if only we achieved the aesthetic, that is, will-less, 
mode of perception while it is happening, not that a certain class of memories enables an 
extraordinary apprehension of the past and the present at once. 
 In the bigger picture this puts a world of difference between Proust and 
Schopenhauer. For Schopenhauer, to be a will-less, timeless subject of cognition is to lose 
oneself and one’s cares. By contrast, part of why the Narrator is so triumphantly jubilant at 
his discovery of involuntary memory is that, through it, he gains a more substantial sense of 
his enduring self; he has become timeless in the sense that he has finally retrieved himself 
from the flow of time. This jubilance must be set against the Narrator’s initial anxieties about 
the passage of time, which set in fairly early on with his ‘suspicion … that I was not situated 
somewhere outside Time, but was subject to its laws, just like those characters in novels who, 
for that reason, used to plunge me into such gloom’ (BG, 74; I 473). His anxious fears are not 
unconnected to, indeed they are presented directly after, his mother’s anxious hope that ‘a 
definite rule of life should discipline the vagaries of [his] nervous system’ – that in devoting 
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